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Abstract:		We	study	the	relative	performance	of	the	first-price	sealed-bid	auction	and	the	second-price	 sealed-bid	 auction	 in	 a	 laboratory	 experiment	 where	 bidders	 can	 signal	information	 through	 their	 bidding	 behavior	 to	 an	 outside	 observer.	We	 consider	 two	different	information	settings:	the	auctioneer	reveals	either	the	identity	of	the	winning	bidder	only,	or	she	also	reveals	 the	winner’s	payment	 to	an	outside	observer.	We	 find	that	 the	 first-price	 sealed-bid	 auction	 in	 which	 the	 winner’s	 payment	 is	 revealed	outperforms	the	other	mechanisms	in	terms	of	revenue	and	efficiency.	Our	findings	may	have	implications	for	the	design	of	charity	auctions,	art	auctions,	and	spectrum	auctions.	
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1.	Introduction	In	 many	 auction	 settings,	 bidders	 care	 about	 how	 their	 behavior	 in	 the	 auction	 is	interpreted	 by	 others.	 Market	 analysts	 can	 consider	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 firm	 in	 an	auction,	 winning	 or	 losing,	 as	 a	 signal	 of	 the	 firm’s	 management	 quality,	 financial	position,	or	confidence	in	its	technological	edge	on	the	competition.1	Signaling	has	also	been	 shown	 to	 be	 an	 important	 motivator	 for	 bidders	 in	 charity	 and	 art	 auctions:	winning	a	Van	Gogh	painting	comes	with	a	great	deal	of	prestige,	whereas	failing	to	win	a	 charity	 auction	may	 leave	 some	 wondering	 about	 the	 losing	 bidder’s	 true	 financial	position	or	magnanimity.2	 In	such	settings,	 signaling	concerns	constitute	an	additional	component	 in	 a	 bidder’s	 bidding	 strategy.	 Recently,	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 has	devoted	ample	attention	 to	 signaling	 in	auctions.3	A	key	 finding	 from	 this	 literature	 is	that	signaling	 incentives	may	vary	across	auction	 formats	so	 that	revenue	equivalence	may	no	longer	hold.		In	 this	 paper,	 we	 experimentally	 examine	 the	 relative	 performance	 of	 two	 common	auction	formats,	the	first-price	sealed-bid	(FP)	auction,	and	the	second-price	sealed-bid	(SP)	auction,	in	a	setting	where	bidders	care	about	an	outside	observer’s	estimation	of	their	values.	In	particular,	we	consider	a	symmetric	independent	private	values	setting	in	which	an	outside	observer	is	partly	informed	about	the	auction	outcome	and	uses	this	information	to	update	her	beliefs	about	the	bidders’	values.	We	consider	two	different	information	settings:	the	auctioneer	reveals	either	the	identity	of	the	winning	bidder	to	the	 outside	 observer	 only,	 or	 she	 also	 reveals	 the	 winner’s	 payment.	 Bos	 and	 Truyts	(2017)	 study	 the	 theoretical	 properties	 of	 our	 experimental	 setting.	 Using	 Banks	 and	Sobel’s	(1987)	D1	criterion	to	select	among	perfect	Bayesian	Nash	equilibria,	they	show	that	 for	 risk-neutral	 bidders,	 second-price	 auctions	 dominate	 first-price	 auctions	 in	terms	 of	 expected	 revenue	 if	 both	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 winner	 and	 her	 payment	 are	revealed	 to	 the	 outside	 observer.4	 For	 both	 auction	 types,	 they	 find	 that	 revenue	increases	when	the	winner’s	payment	is	revealed	to	the	outside	observer.		As	Turocy	(2009)	notes,	signaling	games	are	hard	for	humans	to	play.	This	may	explain	why	there	are	only	a	small	number	of	experiments	regarding	signaling	games.	Moreover,	
																																								 																				1	Liu	(2012)	argues	that	signaling	incentives	could	arise	in	bidding	contests	where	the	winning	bidder	issues	equity	or	debt	for	financing	her	payment.	2	Mandel	(2009)	distinguishes	three	main	motives	for	buying	art:	investment,	direct	consumption,	and	signaling,	and	suggests	that	the	latter	two	explain	the	old	puzzle	as	to	why	art	systematically	underperforms	as	an	investment	compared	to	bonds	and	equity.	Charities	often	raise	funds	by	auctioning	objects	provided	to	them	by	celebrities	(Schram	and	Onderstal,	2009).	A	broad	theoretical	and	empirical	literature	suggests	that	signaling	and	status	are	important	motives	for	contributions	to	charities.	Glazer	and	Konrad	(1996)	and	Harbaugh	(1998a,b)	show	that	signaling	is	an	important	factor	to	explain	patterns	in	donations	to	universities.	3	See	Goeree	(2003);	Das	Varma	(2003);	Katzman	and	Rhodes-Kropf	(2008);	Monar	and	Virag	(2008);	Liu	(2012);	Haile	(2013);	Marinovic	(2014);	Giovannoni	and	Makris	(2014);	and	Bos	and	Truyts	(2017).	4	These	findings	corroborate	earlier	findings	by	Giovannoni	and	Makris	(2014)	who	elicit	conditions	which	guarantee	that	an	auction’s	expected	revenue	only	depends	on	the	information	revealed	to	the	outside	observer,	independently	of	the	auction	format	used.	
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most	of	 these	experiments	 focus	on	equilibrium	selection,	 given	 the	usual	equilibrium	multiplicity	 in	 signaling	games.5	Auctions	with	 signaling	have	hardly	been	analyzed	 in		the	lab.6	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	the	only	other	experimental	paper	on	signaling	in	auctions	 so	 far	 is	by	Fonseca	et	al.	 (2016).	They	consider	a	 setting	where	bidders	 can	signal	their	productivity	to	firms	that	are	hiring	on	a	labor	market.	Fonseca	et	al.	focus	on	several	information	disclosure	policies	within	the	same	auction	format:	the	first-price	sealed-bid	auction.	While	they	find	that	signaling	opportunities	lead	to	more	aggressive	bids,	they	observe	consistent	underbidding	compared	to	equilibrium.	Our	experimental	results	complement	theirs	in	that	our	design	facilitates	between-auction	comparisons.	Our	main	result	is	that	the	first-price	sealed-bid	auction	in	which	the	winner’s	payment	is	 revealed	 outperforms	 the	 other	mechanisms	 in	 terms	 of	 revenue	 and	 efficiency.	 In	both	auctions,	we	observe	more	aggressive	bidding	compared	to	control	 treatments	 in	which	 the	 outside	 observer’s	 estimates	 do	 not	 affect	 the	 bidders’	 payoffs.	 This	underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 revealing	 information	 to	 outsiders	 when	 bidders	 care	about	how	their	behavior	is	interpreted	by	others.	However,	like	Fonseca	et	al.	(2016),	we	 find	 underbidding	 relative	 to	 the	 equilibrium	 prediction.	 Underbidding	 is	particularly	 striking	 for	 the	 second-price	 sealed-bid	 auction	 where	 the	 winner’s	payment	is	revealed	to	the	outside	observer.	As	a	result,	we	do	not	find	support	for	the	theoretical	prediction	that	the	second-price	auction	yields	more	revenue	than	the	first-price	 sealed-bid	 auction	 in	 this	 information	 regime.	Moreover,	 revealing	 the	winner’s	payment	 only	 boosts	 revenue	 in	 the	 first-price	 sealed-bid	 auction,	 not	 in	 the	 second-price	sealed-bid	auction.	The	latter	finding	is	also	inconsistent	with	the	theory.	The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 In	 Section	 2,	 we	 describe	 our	experimental	design	and	protocol.	 In	Section	3,	we	present	 the	 theoretical	 results	and	the	 hypotheses	 tested.	 Section	 4	 contains	 our	 experimental	 findings.	 Section	 5	concludes.		
2.	Experimental	design	and	protocol	The	experiment	was	computerized7	and	run	at	the	CREED	laboratory	of	the	University	of	Amsterdam.	We	employed	a	 full	2x2x2	factorial	design	varying	(between	subjects)	 the	auction	 type	 (FP	 and	 SP),	 the	 information	 about	 the	 auction	 outcome	 that	 is	
																																								 																				5		Brandts	and	Holt	(1993),	de	Haan	et	al.	(2011),	Drouvelis	et	al.	(2012),	and	Jeitschko	and	Normann	(2012).	
6	Previous	experimental	works	on	auctions	focused	on	the	importance	of	disclosure	policies.	Either	bids	are	revealed	to	bidders	(see,	e.g.,	Cason	et	al.,	2011;	Dufwenberg	and	Gneezy,	2002;	and	Neugebauer	and	Selten,	2006),	bidders’	types	are	revealed	to	bidders	(see,	e.g.,	Andreoni	et	al.,	2007),	or	the	auctioneer	releases	some	public	information	(see,	e.g.,	Goeree	and	Offerman,	2002).	However,	none	of	these	investigate	signaling	concerns,	or	how	revealing	information	to	an	outside	observer	affects	bidding	strategies,	efficiency	and	expected	revenues.	7	The	program	was	written	using	PHP	and	mySQL.	
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communicated	to	the	outside	observer	(with	or	without	information	about	the	winner’s	payment),	and	whether	the	bidders’	payoffs	depend	on	the	outside	observer’s	estimate	(in	the	main	treatments,	it	did,	in	the	control	treatments,	it	did	not).	Table	1	summarizes	the	 resulting	 eight	 treatments	 of	 the	 experiment.	 The	 control	 treatments	 serve	 as	 a	benchmark	when	comparing	results	between	auction	types.	Each	treatment	was	comprised	of	seven	groups	of	four	participants.	All	224	participants	took	part	 in	only	one	session	each.	At	the	start	of	each	session,	we	randomly	allocated	participants	over	the	computers	so	they	could	not	infer	which	other	participants	were	in	the	 same	 group.	 We	 provided	 computerized	 instructions	 to	 the	 participants.	 The	instructions	 for	 treatment	 FPWP	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Online	 Appendix	 A.8	 Before	 the	experiment	 started,	 participants	 answered	 test	 questions	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 they	understood	 the	 experimental	 protocol.9	 Sessions	 lasted	 between	 45	 and	 75	 minutes.	Payment	consisted	of	a	show-up	fee	of	7	euros,	plus	a	payoff	related	to	the	total	profits	earned	in	the	30	rounds.	The	exchange	rate	was	1	euro	for	50	experimental	points.	On	average,	participants	earned	16.70	euros	(including	the	show-up	fee).	
Table	1:	Experimental	design	
Treatment	 Auction	 Information	to	the	outside	observer	 Do	bidders’	payoffs	depend	on	outside	observer’s	estimate?	FPW	 FP	 The	winner	 Yes	FPWP	 FP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 Yes	SPW	 SP	 The	winner	 Yes	SPWP	 SP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 Yes	FPW	control	 FP	 The	winner	 No	FPWP	control	 FP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 No	SPW	control	 SP	 The	winner	 No	SPWP	control	 SP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 No		In	all	sessions,	participants	interacted	in	fixed	groups	of	four	(no	rematching).	In	each	of	the	30	 rounds	of	 a	 session,	 a	 fictitious	 good	was	 auctioned.	 In	 each	 round,	 one	 group	member	was	randomly	chosen	by	the	computer	to	play	the	role	of	the	outside	observer.	The	 remaining	 three	 group	 members	 were	 bidders	 in	 an	 auction.	 We	 chose	 to	 let	subjects	 interact	 in	 fixed	 groups,	 and	 have	 them	 take	 turns	 playing	 the	 role	 of	 the	outside	observer	in	their	group.	This	was	done	to	foster	the	learning	needed	to	reach	a	
																																								 																				8	The	instructions	of	the	other	treatments	are	available	from	the	authors	upon	request.	9	These	questions	are	available	from	the	authors	upon	request.	
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perfect	 Bayesian	 equilibrium,	 which	 crucially	 requires	 a	 coordination	 between	 the	bidders’	strategies	and	the	outside	observer’s	beliefs.	Role	switching	also	renders	bidder	collusion	more	difficult.	At	the	start	of	each	round,	all	bidders	were	privately	informed	about	their	value	for	the	good.	 Both	 the	 bidders	 and	 the	 outside	 observer	 were	 informed	 that	 all	 values	 were	independently	drawn	according	 to	a	uniform	distribution	on	 the	set	 {1,2,3,…,100}.	For	the	sake	of	comparability	between	treatments,	we	kept	the	value	draws	constant	across	treatments.	In	the	auction,	each	of	the	three	bidders	independently	submitted	a	bid	for	the	fictitious	good	from	the	set	{0,1,2,…,200}.	The	bidder	with	the	highest	bid	won	the	good.	In	the	FP	auction,	the	winner	paid	his	own	bid,	while	in	the	SP	auction,	the	winner	paid	the	second	highest	bid.	Ties	were	resolved	randomly.	 In	the	main	treatments,	 the	bidder	payoffs	 depended	on	both	 the	 outcome	of	 the	 auction,	 and	 the	 estimate	 of	 the	outside	 observer.	 The	 winning	 bidder	 obtained	 the	 difference	 between	 his	 value	 and	payment.	 In	 addition,	 each	bidder,	win	or	 lose,	 received	half	 of	 the	outside	observer’s	estimate	of	his	value.	After	the	auction,	the	outside	observer	was	asked	to	guess	the	values	of	each	of	the	three	bidders	after	obtaining	information	about	the	outcome	of	the	auction.	In	all	treatments,	she	was	 informed	 about	which	 bidder	won	 the	 auction.	 In	 some	 treatments,	 she	 also	obtained	information	regarding	how	much	the	winner	paid.	The	payoffs	of	 the	outside	observer	 depended	 on	 the	 accuracy	 of	 her	 estimates.	 Once	 she	 had	 entered	 value	estimates	 for	 all	 bidders,	 the	 computer	 drew	 one	 of	 the	 three	 bidders’	 estimates	 at	random.	When	the	outside	observer’s	estimate	for	this	bidder	deviated	𝑥	points	from	the	actual	value,	her	payoff	was	equal	to	40 − 𝑥.		
3.	Theoretical	predictions	In	 this	 section,	 we	 describe	 the	 theoretical	 predictions.	 The	 analysis	 follows	straightforwardly	 from	Bos	and	Truyts	 (2017).	Like	 them,	we	restrict	our	attention	 to	risk-neutral	bidders	and	perfect	Bayesian	Nash	equilibria	that	survive	Banks	and	Sobel’s	(1987)	D1	criterion	(referred	to	as	“equilibrium”	in	the	remainder	of	this	paper).	Table	2	contains	equilibrium	predictions	for	all	treatments.	The	formal	derivations	are	in	Online	Appendix	B.	In	all	treatments,	a	unique	strictly	increasing	and	symmetric	equilibrium	bidding	curve	exists.	For	the	control	treatments,	the	existence	of	an	outside	observer	has	no	effect	on	the	 bidders’	 payoffs.	 Therefore,	 the	 predictions	 are	 standard,	 and	 imply	 revenue	equivalence	across	treatments	(see,	e.g.,	Vickrey,	1961).	If	only	the	identity	of	the	winner	is	revealed	to	the	outside	observer,	bidders’	payoffs	when	winning	are	increased	by	half	the	difference	between	 the	outside	observer’s	 value	 estimates	 for	winners	 and	 losers.	Equilibrium	 bids	 are	 inflated	 by	 this	 number	 compared	 to	 the	 control	 treatments.	 In	
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Online	Appendix	B,	we	show	that	a	bidder’s	payoff	from	winning	the	auction	(and	hence	his	equilibrium	bid)	is	increased	by	about	22.	If	 the	winner’s	 payment	 is	 also	 revealed,	 then	 the	 bidders	will	 also	 take	 into	 account	how	the	outside	observer	updates	her	beliefs	about	the	bidders’	values	in	function	of	the	observed	payment.	In	equilibrium,	the	winner’s	value	is	exactly	revealed	to	the	outside	observer	 in	 the	 FP	 auction,	 since	 the	 equilibrium	 bidding	 curve	 is	 strictly	 increasing.	Therefore,	 the	 outside	 observer	 will	 perfectly	 predict	 the	 winner’s	 value.	 Moreover,	bidders	will	 take	 into	 account	 that	 when	 losing,	 the	 outside	 observer	 estimates	 their	value	to	be	equal	to	half	the	winner’s	value.	A	low-value	bidder	is	better	off,	in	terms	of	the	outside	observer’s	 equilibrium	estimate,	by	 losing	against	 a	 sufficiently	high-value	bidder,	rather	than	by	winning	the	auction.	In	the	opposite	case,	the	difference	between	winning	and	losing	is	large	when	viewed	in	terms	of	the	outside	observer’s	equilibrium	estimate	 for	 high-value	 bidders.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 equilibrium	 bids	 of	 low	 [high]	 value	bidders	 are	 lower	 [higher]	 if	 the	 outside	 observer	 sees	 the	 winner’s	 payment	 as	compared	to	a	situation	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed.		
Table	2:	Equilibrium	predictions	per	treatment	
Treatment	 Auction	 Information	to	the	outside	observer	 Equilibrium	bids	 Expected	revenue	FPW	 FP	 The	winner	 𝐵 𝑣 ≈ 23 𝑣 + 22	 𝑅 ≈ 72	FPWP	 FP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 𝐵(𝑣) = 𝑣	 𝑅 = 75	SPW	 SP	 The	winner	 𝐵 𝑣 ≈ 𝑣 + 22	 𝑅 ≈ 72	SPWP	 SP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 𝐵 𝑣 = 𝑣2 + 62.5	 𝑅 = 87.5	FPW	control	 FP	 The	winner	 𝐵 𝑣 = 23 𝑣	 𝑅 = 50	FPWP	control	 FP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 𝐵 𝑣 = 23 𝑣	 𝑅 = 50	SPW	control	 SP	 The	winner	 𝐵(𝑣) = 𝑣	 𝑅 = 50	SPWP	control	 SP	 The	winner	and	her	payment	 𝐵(𝑣) = 𝑣	 𝑅 = 50	
Notes:	Equilibrium	bids	in	the	unique	symmetric	D1	equilibrium	for	bidder	values	𝑣	being	independently	drawn	from	𝑈[0,100],	and	the	expected	revenue	of	the	auction	in	this	equilibrium.			In	SPWP,	the	winner’s	payment	reveals	the	valuation	of	the	second	highest	bidder	in	the	fully	 separating	 equilibrium,	 but	 the	 outside	 observer	 cannot	 deduce	 which	 losing	bidder	made	the	second	highest	bid.	The	difference	between	winning	and	losing	is	–	in	terms	of	the	outside	observer’s	estimate	–	very	large	for	a	low-value	bidder.	If	he	wins	[loses],	the	outside	observer	optimally	estimates	his	value	to	be	the	average	between	the	second	highest	value	and	100	[3/4	of	the	second	highest	value].	This	leads	a	low-value	
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bidder	 to	 submit	 a	 considerably	 higher	 bid	 when	 the	 outside	 observer	 obtains	information	about	the	winner’s	payment.	In	Online	Appendix	B,	we	formally	derive	the	equilibrium	bidding	strategies.	These	are	presented	in	Table	2.	The	theoretical	predictions	regarding	the	auction’s	revenue	and	bidding	behavior	yield	the	following	hypotheses	which	we	will	test	using	our	experimental	design:	
Hypothesis	 1	 In	 the	 FP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 his	 payment	 to	 the	outside	observer	increases	the	average	auction	revenue	as	compared	to	a	setting	where	only	the	auction	winner	is	revealed.	
Hypothesis	 2	 In	 the	 SP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 his	 payment	 to	 the	outside	observer	increases	the	average	auction	revenue	as	compared	to	a	setting	where	only	the	auction	winner	is	revealed.	
Hypothesis	3	In	the	setting	where	both	the	winner	and	his	payment	are	revealed	to	the	outside	observer,	the	average	auction	revenue	is	higher	in	the	SP	auction	than	in	the	FP	auction.	
Hypothesis	4	In	the	setting	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed	to	the	outside	observer,	the	FP	auction	and	the	SP	auction	yield	the	same	revenue,	on	average.		
4.	Results	In	 this	 section,	 we	 present	 our	 experimental	 results.	 We	 start	 in	 subsection	 4.1	 by	comparing	 the	 auction	 revenue	 between	 treatments.	 In	 subsection	 4.2,	 we	 analyze	bidding	 behavior.	 In	 subsection	 4.3,	 we	 discuss	 the	 outside	 observer’s	 estimates	 and	their	 effect	 on	 bids.	 Finally,	 in	 subsection	 4.4,	 we	 present	 an	 efficiency	 comparison	between	auctions.	Concerning	the	statistical	analysis,	 two-sided	Mann-Whitney	U	tests	are	 employed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 non-parametric	 analysis,	 using	 groups	 as	 single	observations.	The	parametric	analyses	are	based	on	ordinary	 least-square	regressions,	where	standard	errors	are	clustered	by	group.	Unless	stated	otherwise,	the	results	refer	to	 the	 main	 treatments,	 i.e.,	 where	 the	 outside	 observers’	 estimates	 affect	 bidders’	payoffs.	
	
4.1.	Auction	revenue	In	this	subsection,	we	explore	the	effect	of	the	auction	type	and	the	information	revealed	to	the	outside	observer	on	auction	revenue.	Figure	1	shows	the	average	auction	revenue	for	each	of	the	treatments.	The	FP	auction	where	both	the	winner	and	his	payment	are	communicated	 to	 the	outside	observer	yields	 the	highest	revenue	on	average;	average	auction	revenue	is	significantly	higher	in	FPWP	than	in	the	other	non-control	treatments	(p=0.08,	p=0.00,	and	p=0.04	for	FPW,	SPWP,	and	SPW,	respectively).	In	particular,	in	the	
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FP	 auction,	 revealing	 the	winner	 and	his	 payment	 increases	 the	 auction’s	 revenue,	 on	average,	by	almost	7	units	as	compared	to	the	case	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed.	The	 increase	 in	 revenues	 is	 even	 greater	 when	 comparing	 FPWP	 with	 both	 SP	treatments.	A	parametric	analysis,	where	the	highest	valuation	is	 included	as	a	control	variable,	 confirms	 this	 result	 (see	Table	3).	 Figure	2	 represents	 the	 regression	 results	graphically.	 The	 revenue	 estimates	 are	 higher	 in	 FPWP	 than	 in	 any	 of	 the	 other	treatments	for	all	highest	values	above	20	(i.e.,	for	98%	of	the	realizations	of	the	highest	values).	
Figure	1:	Average	auction	revenue	by	treatment	
	
	
Table	3:	Auction	revenue	per	treatment	controlling	for	the	highest	value		 Revenue	(1)	 Revenue	(2)	
Intercept	 -5.8736	(3.3687)	 10.0810	(2.4631)***	
HighestValue	 0.9891	(0.0499)***	 0.7847	(0.0268)***	
FPWP	 7.1048	(2.2286)**	 -5.2341	(8.7926)	
SPWP	 -8.3524	(2.0827)***	 -27.8704	(7.5080)***	
SPW	 -4.4095	(3.3687)	 -36,3713	(6,8149)***	
HighestValue*FPWP	 	 0.1543	(0.1318)	
HighestValue*SPWP	 	 0.2442	(0.0923)**	
HighestValue*SPW	 	 0.3999	(2.4631)***	
N	 840	 	
Notes:	Clustered	 standard	errors	 in	parentheses.	 FPW	 is	 the	 reference	 treatment.	HighestValue	denotes	the	highest	value	among	the	three	bidders.	FPWP	raises	significantly	higher	revenue	than	SPW	and	SPWP	(p<0.01).	SPWP	and	SPW	do	not	differ	significantly	from	each	other	in	terms	of	revenue	raised	at	the	90%	level.	*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01.	
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Figure	2:	Revenue	 estimates	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 highest	 value	 in	 a	 bidder	 group	 per	treatment	
	
Note:	The	curves	are	based	on	the	linear	regression	estimates	reported	in	Table	3.	Due	to	the	fact	that	the	FP	auction	generally	yields	more	revenue	in	the	lab	than	the	SP	auction	does,10	we	check	for	the	robustness	of	our	findings	in	a	difference-in-difference	analysis	 where	 we	 compare	 the	 revenues	 in	 the	 main	 treatments,	 correcting	 for	 the	revenues	obtained	in	the	control	treatments.	We	do	so	by	running	a	linear	regression	of	revenue	on	treatment	dummies.	Table	4	reports	the	estimated	differences	between	the	treatments	and	the	corresponding	p-values.		
Table	 4:	 Difference	 in	 auction	 revenue	 between	 treatments	 relative	 to	 the	
corresponding	control	treatments		 FPWP	 SPWP	 SPW	
FPW	 -7.29***	(p=0.01)	 4.60	(p=0.23)	 -3.50	(p=0.39)	
FPWP	 -	 11.89**	(p=0.02)	 3.79	(p=0.26)	
SPWP	 	 -	 -8.00*	(p=0.06)	
Notes:	The	numbers	 reported	 are	 the	differences	 between	 the	 treatment	 in	 the	 row	and	 the	 one	 in	 the	column	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 revenue	 differences	 between	 main	 treatment	 and	 control	 treatment.	 *p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01	
	
																																								 																				10	See	Kagel	(1995)	for	an	overview.	
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Result	 1:	 In	 the	 FP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 his	 payment	 significantly	
increases	 revenue	 for	 the	 auctioneer	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 case	where	 only	 the	winner	 is	
revealed.		This	result	confirms	hypothesis	1.	The	FPWP	treatment	yields	higher	revenues	 for	 the	auctioneer	 than	 the	 FPW	 treatment	 does.	 This	 means	 that	 in	 the	 FP	 auction,	 the	auctioneer	can	increase	her	revenue	by	publishing	the	auction’s	winning	bid,	rather	than	publishing	the	winner	only.		Regarding	the	SP	auction,	 there	are	no	significant	differences	between	SPWP	and	SPW	treatments	(p=0.41).	
Result	 2:	 In	 the	 SP	 auction,	 revealing	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 his	 payment	 does	 not	
significantly	 increase	auction	 revenue	as	 compared	 to	 the	 case	where	only	 the	winner	 is	
revealed.	 In	 a	 difference-in-difference	 analysis,	 revealing	 the	 winner’s	 payment	 yields	
significantly	lower	revenue.	This	result	contradicts	hypothesis	2.	The	availability	of	more	information	increases	the	auctioneer’s	 revenue	 in	 the	 FP	 auction,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 SP	 auction.	 The	 driving	 force	behind	 this	 result	 may	 be	 that	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 outside	 observers’	 estimates	 of	bidders’	values	is	higher	in	FPWP	compared	to	FPW,	but	not	in	SPWP	compared	to	SPW,	as	we	will	show	in	subsection	4.4.	
Result	 3:	When	 both	 the	 winner	 and	 his	 payment	 are	 revealed,	 the	 FP	 auction	 raises	
significantly	more	money	than	the	SP	auction	does.	Result	 3	 contradicts	 hypothesis	 3.	 Again,	 the	 outside	 observers’	 accuracy,	 and	 how	bidders	 respond	 to	differences	 in	value	estimates	 for	winners	and	 losers,	may	explain	this	result.	The	analysis	of	bidding	behavior	 in	subsection	4.2	sheds	more	 light	on	this	discrepancy	between	the	experimental	results	and	the	theoretical	predictions.		Comparing	FP	and	SP	auctions	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed,	the	average	revenue	is	3.53	points	higher	in	FPW	than	in	SPW,	but	not	significantly	different	(p=0.18).		
Result	4:	When	only	the	winner	is	revealed,	FP	and	SP	auctions	do	not	differ	significantly	
in	terms	of	average	auction	revenue.	This	 result	 is	 in	 line	with	 hypothesis	 4.	 The	 observed	 average	 revenues	 for	 FPW	 and	SPW	are	also	not	far	from	the	theoretical	predictions.		
4.2.	Bidding	behavior	In	 this	 subsection,	we	analyze	 the	subjects’	bidding	behavior	 to	discover	 the	extent	 to	which	it	 is	 in	 line	with	the	theoretical	predictions	and,	 if	not,	how	it	contributes	to	the	rejection	 of	 some	 of	 our	 hypotheses	 in	 the	 previous	 subsection.	 Table	 C.1	 in	 Online	
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Appendix	 C	 includes	 scatter	 plots	which	 contrast	 bids	 submitted	with	 the	 theoretical	predictions.	We	start	by	exploring	how	bidding	strategies	depend	on	whether	the	outside	observer	influences	bidders’	payoffs.	Figure	3	shows	average	bids	per	treatment.	For	all	auctions,	and	 for	 all	 values	 greater	 than	 zero,	 equilibrium	 bids	 are,	 on	 average,	 higher	 if	 the	outside	 observer’s	 estimates	 affect	 bidders’	 payoffs.	 In	 the	 FP	 auction,	 when	 outside	observers’	 estimates	 affect	 bidders’	 payoffs,	 bidders	 bid	 more	 aggressively	 when	compared	 to	 the	 treatments	where	 their	 payoffs	 only	 depends	 on	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	auction	(p=0.00	and	p=0.07	for	FPWP	and	FPW,	respectively).	In	the	SP	auction,	average	bids	 are	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 control	 treatments,	 although	 the	 difference	 is	 only	statistically	significant	in	SPW	and	not	in	SPWP	(p=0.06	and	p=0.57,	respectively).11	By	and	 large,	 average	 bidders’	 responses	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 equilibrium	 logic	 in	 all	treatments.	In	 the	main	 treatments,	 revealing	 the	winner	 and	his	payment	 increases	 average	bids	significantly	in	the	FP	auction	as	compared	to	the	case	when	only	the	winner	is	revealed	(p=0.04).	In	contrast,	no	significant	differences	between	bids	are	found	in	the	SP	auction	when	 the	 information	 revealed	 to	 the	 outside	 observer	 is	modified	 (p=0.95).	 Perhaps	not	surprisingly,	these	observations	are	in	line	with	the	observed	treatment	differences	in	terms	of	revenue.	
Figure	3:	Average	bids	in	FP	and	SP	auctions	
		We	 now	 turn	 to	 analyzing	 bidding	 behavior	 in	 the	 FP	 auction.	 Table	 5	 presents	estimated	bidding	functions,	and	Figure	4	contrasts	these	with	the	equilibrium	bidding	curves	in	Table	2.	Bids	in	FPWP	diverge	from	the	theoretical	predictions	to	some	extent.	The	intercept	is	significantly	greater	(p<0.01)	and	the	slope	is	less	steep	(p=0.03)	than	the	theoretical	prediction.	As	a	consequence,	low-value	bidders	submit	higher	bids	than	in	equilibrium,	while	high-value	bidders	submit	slightly	lower	bids.	On	average,	bidders	
																																								 																				11	A	potential	explanation	of	the	latter	observation	is	the	high	frequency	of	extreme	overbidding	compared	to	the	weakly	dominant	strategy	of	bidding	value	in	SPWPcontrol	(see	Table	C.1	in	Online	Appendix	C).	
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behave	similar	to	the	predictions.12	For	FPW,	the	estimated	bidding	curve	lies	below	the	theoretical	 prediction	 (p=0.03	 and	 p=0.02	 for	 the	 differences	 in	 slope	 and	 intercept,	respectively,	 between	 the	 observed	 bids	 and	 the	 theoretical	 prediction)	 for	 low	 and	intermediate	 values.	 As	 the	 scatter	 plot	 in	 Online	 Appendix	 C	 indicates,	 it	 is	 mainly	subjects	 with	 low	 and	 intermediate	 values	 who	 underbid.	 Notice	 that	 equilibrium	bidding	entails	bids	above	value	for	values	below	66.	Subjects	seem	to	be	hesitant	about	submitting	bids	above	their	value;	in	the	case	that	value	is	lower	than	66,	about	70%	of	the	 bids	 are	 actually	 below	 value.	 In	 contrast	 with	 the	main	 treatments,	 subjects	 bid	more	aggressively	in	the	control	treatments	than	in	the	equilibrium	prediction,	not	less.	This	is	in	line	with	what	is	generally	observed	in	the	FP	auction	in	the	lab.13	
Table	5:	Estimated	bidding	function	for	the	FP	auction		 Bid	 Theoretical	prediction	
Intercept	 6.2476*	(2.8823)	 22	
Value	 0.8048***	(0.0481)	 2/3	
FPWP	 2.1628*	(1.0733)	 -22	
FPWPcontrol	 -6.0022**	(2.7355)	 -22	
FPWcontrol	 -5.9411*	(2.6659)	 -22	
Value*FPWP	 0.0224	(0.0444)	 1/3	
Value*FPWPcontrol	 0.0118	(0.0687)	 0	
Value*FPWcontrol	 0.0441	(0.0485)	 0	
N	 2518	 	
Notes:	 Clustered	 standard	 errors	 in	 parentheses.	 FPW	 is	 the	 reference	 treatment.	 *p<0.1,	 **p<0.05,	***p<0.01.		
Figure	4:	Estimated	bidding	functions	vs.	theoretical	predictions	for	the	FP	auction	
	
Note:	 The	 solid	 lines	 are	 estimates	 based	 on	 the	 linear	 regression	 estimates	 reported	 in	 Table	 4.	 The	dashed	lines	refer	to	the	theoretical	predictions	in	Table	2.	
																																								 																				
12	See	Table	C.1.	in	Appendix	C.	13	See,	e.g.,	Cox	et	al.	(1988);	Harrison	(1989);	Kagel	(1995);	and	Goeree	et	al.	(2002).	
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Result	5	summarizes	the	main	findings	for	bidding	behavior	in	the	FP	auction.	
Result	 5:	 In	 the	 FP	 auction,	 compared	 to	 the	 control	 treatments,	 bidders	 bid	 more	
aggressively	 when	 the	 outside	 observer’s	 estimates	 affect	 their	 payoffs.	 Bidders	 in	 FPW	
tend	 to	 underbid	 relative	 to	 the	 equilibrium	 prediction,	 particularly	 for	 low	 and	
intermediate	values.	In	FPWP,	bidders	overbid	for	low	values	and	underbid	for	high	values.	We	now	turn	to	the	SP	auction.	Figure	5	displays	estimated	bidding	functions	based	on	the	 regressions	 reported	 in	 Table	 6.	 In	 both	 treatments,	 bidders	 tend	 to	 significantly	underbid	 relative	 to	 the	 equilibrium	 predictions.	 In	 SPWP,	 low-value	 bidders	 in	particular	 bid	 substantially	 lower	 than	 the	 equilibrium	 prediction	 (p<0.01	 for	 the	differences	between	the	observed	bids	and	the	theoretical	prediction	for	both	the	slope	and	the	intercept).	They	seem	to	feel	hesitant	to	bid	as	much	as	62.5	points	above	their	value.	 In	 SPW,	 bidders	 underbid	 on	 average	 over	 the	 entire	 value	 range	 (p=0.45	 and	p=0.01	for	the	differences	in	slope	and	intercept	respectively	between	the	observed	bids	and	the	theoretical	prediction).	Bidders	bid	22	points	above	their	value	according	to	the		equilibrium	 prediction.	 Again,	 subjects	 are	 hesitant	 to	 submit	 bids	 which	 are	significantly	greater	 than	 their	values,	as	 the	scatter	plot	 in	Online	Appendix	C	shows.	Only	63%	of	 the	bids	are	above	value,	and	 the	majority	of	 these	are	 in	between	value	and	value	plus	22.	
Result	 6:	 In	 SPW,	 the	 average	 bid	 is	 significantly	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 control	 treatment.	
Bidders	tend	to	underbid	as	compared	to	the	equilibrium	prediction.	
Result	 7:	 In	 SPWP,	 the	 average	 bid	 is	 not	 significantly	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 control	
treatment.	 Bidders	 tend	 to	 underbid	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 equilibrium	 prediction,	
particularly	bidders	with	low	values.		
Table	6:	Estimated	bidding	functions	for	the	SP	auction	
	 Bid	 Theoretical	prediction	
Intercept	 11.4418***	(2.6629)	 22	
Value	 1.0526***	(0.06521)	 1	
SPWP		 8.0788**	(3.1726)	 40.5	
SPWPcontrol	 -3.3336	(4.8040)	 -22	
SPWcontrol	 -9.2593**	(2.8356)	 -22	
Value*SPWP	 						-0.1781**	(0.0664)	 -1/2	
Value*SPWPcontrol	 0.0251	(0.0553)	 0	
Value*SPWcontrol	 0.0122	(0.0966)	 0	
N	 2509	 	
Notes:	 Clustered	 standard	 errors	 in	 parentheses.	 SPW	 is	 the	 reference	 treatment.	 *p<0.1,	 **p<0.05,	***p<0.01.	
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Figure	5:	Estimated	bidding	functions	vs.	theoretical	predictions	for	the	SP	auction		
	 		In	all	treatments,	underbidding	relative	to	equilibrium	is	most	prominent	in	SPWP.	This	is	likely	the	case	because	bidders	feel	hesitant	to	bid	substantially	more	than	their	value	as	 the	equilibrium	prediction	dictates.	Moreover,	 the	high	bids	of	 low-value	bidders	 in	the	equilibrium	prediction	crucially	depend	on	the	outside	observer	making	the	correct	inferences.	 In	 the	 next	 subsection,	 we	 shall	 see	 that	 the	 observed	 outside	 observer’s	estimates	are	systematically	biased,	and	that	this	is	particularly	the	case	for	SPWP	in	the	case	of	low	payments	by	the	winner.	As	a	result,	revenue	in	SPWP	is	not	greater	than	in	FPWP	or	SPW,	in	contrast	to	hypotheses	2	and	3.		Finally,	bidding	functions	in	SPWP	and	SPW	are	compared.	Even	though	average	bids	do	not	differ	between	both	treatments,	the	bidding	functions	differ	significantly	from	each	other.	 In	 particular,	 low-value	 bidders	 place	 higher	 bids	 in	 SPWP	 than	 in	 SPW	 (the	intercept	is	significantly	higher	in	SPWP).	This	result	is	reversed	for	high-value	bidders	(bidding	 function	 is	 significantly	 steeper	 in	 SPW).	 As	 such,	 these	 findings	 are	qualitatively	in	line	with	the	theoretical	predictions.	
	
4.3.	Outside	observers’	estimates	and	their	effect	on	bids	In	the	previous	subsection,	we	observed	that	bids	in	FPWP	are	close	to	equilibrium,	on	average.	While	 in	 the	 other	 treatments,	we	 observe	 consistent	 underbidding.	Much	 of	the	underbidding	is	explained	by	bidders	relying	on	bids	which	are	close	to	their	values,	while	equilibrium	sometimes	requires	substantial	overbidding.	In	this	subsection,	we	explore	the	extent	to	which	the	outside	observers’	behavior	drives	these	bidding	patterns.	Bidding	above	value	is	optimal	in	equilibrium	because	winning	the	auction	implies	an	additional	reward	in	terms	of	the	outside	observer’s	inference.	In	the	experiment,	this	particular	reward	depends	on	the	actual	behavior	of	the	subject	in	the	 role	 of	 the	 outside	 observer.	We	 first	 analyze	 how	 the	 types	 of	 auctions,	 and	 the	different	 elements	 of	 information	 provided	 to	 the	 outside	 observer,	 influence	 her	
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estimates	 of	 the	 bidders’	 values.	We	 then	 analyze	 how	 these	 estimates	 affect	 bidding	behavior.	 In	 particular,	 we	 conjecture	 two	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 the	 outside	observer	 can	 affect	 bidding	 strategies:	 first,	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 outside	 observers’	estimates	for	winners	and	losers	may	differ	between	treatments	or	among	groups,	and	this	 may	 influence	 bidding	 behavior.	 Second,	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 outside	 observer’s	estimates	may	also	have	an	effect	on	the	bids.	Figures	 C.2	 and	 C.3	 in	 Online	 Appendix	 C	 contrast	 the	 value	 estimates	 of	 the	 outside	observers	and	the	actual	values,	for	winners,	for	losers,	and	for	the	difference	between	winners	 and	 losers,	 considering	different	winners’	 payments	 and	 all	main	 treatments.	When	 outside	 observers	 are	 only	 informed	 about	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 winner,	 their	guesses	cannot	depend	on	the	winner’s	payment.	Therefore,	by	construction,	estimates	for	winners	 and	 losers	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 the	winner’s	 payment	 in	 FPW	 and	 SPW.	 In	addition,	in	both	types	of	auctions,	outside	observers	underestimate	winners’	values	and	overestimate	 losers’	 values	 on	 average.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 in	 both	 FPW	and	 SPW,	 the	differences	 between	 the	 value	 of	 the	 winners	 and	 the	 value	 of	 the	 losers	 are	underestimated,	such	that	the	additional	benefit	for	the	winning	bidder	is	smaller	than	in	the	theoretical	prediction.	In	particular,	on	average,	the	estimated	difference	between	the	value	of	the	winner	and	the	value	of	the	loser	is	20.63	and	23.62	for	FPW	and	SPW,	respectively.	These	do	not	differ	significantly	(p=0.95).	The	bidders’	best	response	is	to	inflate	their	bids	relative	to	the	control	treatments	by	half	that	difference,	i.e.,	by	10.32	and	11.81	points	 in	FPW	and	SPW,	 respectively.	According	 to	 the	data,	bidders	 inflate	their	bids	with	respect	to	the	controls	by	3.66	and	8.61	points	on	average	 in	FPW	and	SPW,	respectively	 (see	Figure	3).	Overbidding	 is	 slightly	 lower	 than	expected,	but	 it	 is	close	to,	and	qualitatively	in	line	with,	the	theoretical	predictions.	In	FPWP	and	SPWP,	 the	outside	observers	 can	adjust	 their	 estimates	 for	winners	 and	losers	 depending	 on	 the	 information	 received	 regarding	 the	 winner’s	 payment	 (the	highest	bid	in	FPWP	and	the	second	highest	bid	in	SPWP).	Figures	C.2	and	C.3	in	Online	Appendix	C	 show	 that	 the	estimates	 for	 the	values	of	both	 the	winners	and	 the	 losers	increase	 with	 the	 winners’	 payment	 in	 both	 FPWP	 and	 SPWP	 (p<0.02).	 Similarly,	 in	auctions	 where	 only	 the	 winner	 is	 revealed,	 the	 outside	 observers	 generally	underestimate	the	winners’	values,	and	overestimate	the	losers’	values.	On	average,	the	difference	between	the	estimated	value	of	the	winner	and	the	value	of	the	loser	is	23.21	and	18.42	for	FPWP	and	SPWP,	respectively.	These	numbers	do	not	significantly	differ	between	 both	 auctions,	 and	 in	 fact,	 they	 do	 not	 differ	 significantly	 between	 the	 four	treatments.		The	 difference	 in	 estimates,	 conditional	 on	 the	 winner’s	 payment,	 does	 differ	significantly	 between	 auctions.	 The	 empirical	 differences	 between	 the	 outside	observers’	estimates	of	the	winners’	and	losers’	value	are	plotted	in	Tables	C.2	and	C.3	in	Online	 Appendix	 C.	 Figure	 6	 includes	 results	 from	 linear	 regressions	 of	 the	 actual	differences	 in	 the	 winner’s	 payment.	 In	 theory,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 outside	observer’s	 estimates	 of	 the	 winners’	 and	 losers’	 value	 increases	 with	 the	 winner’s	
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payment	 in	 the	 FPWP	 and	 decreases	with	 the	winner’s	 payment	 in	 the	 SPWP.	 In	 line	with	 the	 theory,	 the	 difference	 significantly	 increases	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 winner’s	payment	in	the	FPWP	(p=0.02),	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent	than	theoretically	predicted.	In	contrast,	the	difference	between	estimates	for	winners	and	losers	does	not	depend	in	a	statistically	 meaningful	 way	 on	 the	 winner’s	 payments	 in	 the	 SPWP	 (p=0.95).	 This	suggests	 a	 possible	 explanation	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 low-value	 bidders,	 especially,	underbid	in	comparison	to	the	theoretical	prediction	in	the	SPWP,	and	that	the	observed	behavior	does	not	corroborate	hypothesis	3.	
Result	 8:	 The	 outside	 observers	 generally	 underestimate	 the	 value	 of	 the	 winners	 and	
overestimate	the	value	of	the	losers.	As	a	consequence,	the	difference	between	the	winner’s	
and	the	losers’	value	is	underestimated	in	all	treatments.	
Figure	 6:	Differences	 in	 the	 outside	 observer’s	 value	 estimates	 between	winners	 and	losers	
	
Notes:	The	figure	plots	the	results	of	linear	regressions	of	the	observed	differences	between	the	outside	observer’s	value	estimates	for	the	winners	and	the	losers	(dashed	line)	as	well	as	the	actual	differences	between	winners’	and	losers’	values	on	the	winner’s	payment.	
	
4.4.	Efficiency	In	this	subsection,	we	undertake	an	efficiency	analysis	to	determine	which	combination	of	auction	and	information	scenario	yields	the	highest	average	aggregate	payoffs	for	all	parties	that	participate	in	our	setting.	For	a	given	group	and	auction	type,	the	efficiency	in	period	t	comprises	the	sum	of	three	terms:	
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦A = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟A + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑂𝑂A + 12 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒MA	NMOP 	where	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟A	is	the	value	of	the	winner	of	the	auction	at	period	𝑡,	𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑂𝑂A	are	 the	 earnings	 of	 the	 outside	 observer	 at	 period	 𝑡,	 and	 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒MA	 is	 the	 outside	observer’s	 estimate	 of	 bidder	 𝑖	 at	 period	 𝑡.	 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟A	 measures	 the	 auction’s	efficiency	 in	 terms	 of	 allocating	 the	 object.	 The	 second	 term	 in	 the	 expression	 above	measures	 the	 payoffs	 of	 the	 outside	 observer.	 The	 last	 term	measures	 the	 sum	of	 the	
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payoffs	obtained	by	the	three	bidders	through	the	estimates	from	the	outside	observer.	Efficiency	does	not	depend	on	the	auction’s	revenue	(it	is	a	welfare-neutral	transaction	between	 a	 bidder	 and	 the	 auctioneer).	 Figure	 11	 compares	 the	 average	 value	 of	 each	term	and	the	overall	average	efficiency	between	treatments.	The	 average	 value	 of	 the	 winner	 in	 the	 auction	 is	 the	 highest	 in	 the	 FPW	 treatment	(p=0.06,	 p=0.06	 and	 p=0.08	with	 respect	 to	 FPWP,	 SPWP	 and	 SPW	 respectively).	 The	average	value	of	 the	winner	 is	not	 significantly	different	when	 compared	 to	 the	other	treatments.	This	means	that	the	FP	auction	where	only	the	winner	is	revealed	allocates	the	 good	 in	 the	 most	 efficient	 way	 among	 the	 bidders.	 In	 other	 words,	 even	 though	revealing	 the	 winner’s	 payment	 in	 the	 FP	 auction	 increases	 average	 earnings	 for	 the	auctioneer,	it	reduces	the	allocative	efficiency	of	the	auction.	
Figure	11:	Efficiency	comparison	between	treatments.	
	
		Table	7	presents	 two	other	measures	of	allocative	efficiency.	The	 first	measure	shows	the	percentage	of	auctions	in	which	the	bidder	with	the	highest	valuation	wins	for	each	treatment.	The	second	measure	 is	the	average	ratio	of	the	value	of	the	winning	bidder	over	 the	 value	 of	 the	 bidder	 with	 the	 highest	 value.	 According	 to	 both	 measures,	
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allocative	 efficiency	 varies	 significantly	 across	 treatments.	 In	 particular,	 efficiency	 in	FPWP	is	significantly	lower	than	in	FPW.	Note	that	the	allocative	efficiency	in	both	WP	treatments	is	also	clearly	lower	than	the	usual	efficiency	levels	in	the	literature.14	Table	7:	Allocative	efficiency	
Notes:	*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01.		The	outside	observer’s	average	earnings	are	significantly	higher	in	FPWP	as	compared	to	 FPW,	 SPWP,	 and	 SPW	 (p=0.04,	 p=0.02,	 p=0.02,	 respectively).	 No	 significant	differences	 in	 outside	 observer’s	 earnings	 are	 found	 between	 the	 other	 three	treatments.	This	means	that	the	outside	observer	has	the	highest	accuracy	in	estimating	bidders’	values	in	the	FP	auction	where	both	the	winner	and	his	payment	are	revealed.	Revealing	the	winning	payment	helps	outside	observers	to	increase	the	accuracy	of	their	estimates	in	the	FP	auction,	but	it	does	not	help	in	the	SP	auction.	A	possible	explanation	for	this	is	that	revealing	the	winner’s	payment	gives	different	information	to	the	outside	observers	in	the	FP	auction	than	in	the	SP	auction.	The	winning	payment	represents	the	own	bid	of	the	winner	in	the	FP	auction,	but	it	only	represents	the	second	highest	bid	in	the	SP	auction.	Hence,	the	winner’s	payment	allows	the	outside	observer	to	theoretically	pinpoint	the	value	of	at	least	one	bidder	with	certainly	in	the	FP	auction.	While,	on	the	other	hand,	no	bidder	can	be	fully	identified	in	the	SP	auction.	We	 find	 that	 in	 FPWP	and	 SPWP,	 bidders	 obtain	 significantly	 higher	payoffs	 from	 the	outside	 observer’s	 estimates	 than	 in	 FPW	 and	 SPW,	 respectively	 (p=0.01	 and	 p=0.06	respectively).	 Therefore,	 revealing	 more	 information	 induces	 outside	 observers	 to	increase	 their	 value	 estimates	 so	 that,	 in	 turn,	 bidders	 benefit	 more	 from	 signaling.	Neither	the	differences	between	FPWP	and	SPWP,	nor	those	between	FPW	and	SPW,	are	statistically	significant	(p=0.53	and	p=0.25,	respectively).	All	 in	 all,	 none	 of	 the	 treatments	 outperform	 the	 others	 in	 all	 three	 performance	measures.	In	particular,	there	is	a	trade-off	between	allocative	efficiency	and	the	payoffs	bidders	earn	from	the	outside	observer’s	estimates.	Total	average	efficiency	is	higher	in	FPWP	 and	 SPWP	 as	 compared	 to	 FPW	 and	 SPW	 (p=0.03	 and	 p=0.03,	 respectively).	Therefore,	 more	 information	 increases	 overall	 average	 efficiency	 in	 both	 FP	 and	 SP	auctions.	However,	we	should	be	cautious	with	 this	 result	because	 the	earnings	of	 the	
																																								 																				14	See,	for	example,	Cox	et	al.	(1982)	and	Kagel	and	Levin	(1993).	
Treatment	
%	highest	
value	wins	
Difference	
with	FPW	
Value	winner/Highest	value	
Difference	
with	FPW	FPW	 83.3%	 	 97.5%	 	FPWP	 71.9%	 -11.43%***	 93.9%	 -3.68%**	SPW	 76.7%	 -6.67%	 95.2%	 -2.34%	SPWP	 76.2%	 -7.14%*	 92.7%	 -4.84%***	
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outside	observer	and	 the	bidders	are	not	necessarily	expressed	 in	 the	same	monetary	units.	
Result	 9:	 Allocative	 efficiency	 is	 significantly	 higher	 in	 FPW	 than	 in	 the	 other	 three	
treatments	 which,	 in	 turn,	 do	 not	 differ	 significantly	 between	 each	 other	 in	 terms	 of	
allocative	 efficiency.	 FPWP	 yields	 significantly	 higher	 bidder	 payoffs	 from	 the	 outside	
observer’s	 estimates	 than	 the	 other	 treatments	which,	 in	 turn,	 do	not	 differ	 significantly	
regarding	this	outcome	measure.	Both	bidder	payoffs	from	the	outside	observer’s	estimates	
and	overall	efficiency	are	significantly	higher	in	FPWP	and	SPWP	than	in	SPW	and	FPW,	
respectively.	When	keeping	the	information	revelation	policy	fixed,	the	two	auctions	do	not	
differ	significantly	along	those	outcome	measures.	
	
5.	Conclusion	In	 many	 auction	 settings,	 bidders	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 signal	 their	 generosity,	wealth,	 or	productivity	 to	outside	observers.	The	applications	of	 this	 range	 from	 local	charity	 auctions	 to	 multi-million	 dollar	 art	 auctions,	 and	 even	 to	 multi-billion	 dollar	spectrum	 auctions.	 A	 primary-school	 pupil’s	 parent	 may	 submit	 a	 high	 bid	 in	 the	school’s	 fundraising	event	to	signal	her	generosity	to	other	parents.	A	bidder	 in	an	art	auction	 may	 want	 to	 signal	 his	 wealth	 to	 third	 parties	 by	 submitting	 high	 bids.	 A	telecommunications	 firm’s	behavior	 in	a	 spectrum	auction	 contains	 information	about	the	quality	of	its	management	which	may	be	a	valuable	signal	by	the	firm’s	management	to	investors	and	the	labor	market.	Signaling	in	auctions	has	received	ample	attention	in	recent	 literature.	 Still,	 our	 paper	 is	 the	 first	 study	 which	 compares	 the	 relative	performance	 of	 commonly	 used	 auction	 formats	 in	 an	 experimental	 setting.	 In	 the	experiment,	we	compared	the	first-price	sealed-bid	auction	and	second-price	sealed-bid	auctions	under	two	information	regimes:	in	one,	the	auctioneer	only	reveals	the	identity	of	the	winner,	and	in	the	other,	she	also	publishes	the	winner’s	payment.		Our	key	finding	is	that	the	first-price	sealed-bid	auction	in	which	the	winner’s	payment	is	revealed	performs	the	best	among	the	mechanisms	studied	 in	terms	of	revenue	and	overall	 efficiency.	 Moreover,	 revealing	 the	 winner’s	 payment	 inflates	 the	 bids	 in	 the	first-price	auction,	but	it	does	not	do	so	in	the	second-price	auction.	These	findings	are	robust	 in	 that	 we	 obtain	 qualitatively	 the	 same	 results	 in	 a	 difference-in-difference	analysis	 where	 we	 compare	 the	 revenues	 in	 the	 main	 treatments,	 correcting	 for	 the	revenues	 obtained	 in	 control	 treatments.	Our	 efficiency	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 both	 the	outside	observer	and	the	bidders	benefit	 from	revealing	the	winner’s	payment	 in	both	auctions,	albeit	at	the	cost	of	allocative	efficiency	in	the	first-price	auction.	Overall,	our	experimental	results	suggest	that	both	the	auction	type	and	the	amount	of	information	 revealed	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	 auction	 performance,	especially	 in	 a	 context	where	bidders	 care	 about	 how	 their	 behavior	 in	 the	 auction	 is	interpreted	by	others.	The	average	revenue	in	the	first-price	sealed-bid	auction,	where	
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the	auctioneer	reveals	the	winner’s	payment,	 is	10-25%	higher	than	in	the	three	other	mechanisms	 studied.	 This	 finding	 suggests	 that	 it	 might	 be	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	organizers	 of	 charity	 auctions,	 art	 auctions,	 and	 spectrum	 auctions	 to	 use	 first-price	auctions,	 rather	 than	 second-price	 auctions,	 and,	 moreover,	 to	 reveal	 how	 much	 the	winner	pays.	A	 natural	 follow-up	 question	 concerns	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 our	 results	 can	 be	extrapolated	in	the	field.	Field	experiments	may	reveal	the	circumstances	under	which	first-price	auctions	actually	perform	better	than	second-price	auctions	in	settings	where	bidders	 have	 signaling	 opportunities.	 Carpenter	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 provide	 suggestive	evidence	in	this	direction.	In	a	field	experiment	conducted	during	fundraising	campaigns	at	preschools,	 they	 find	that	 the	 first-price	sealed-bid	auction	raises	more	money	than	the	second-price	sealed-bid	auction.	More	generally,	future	experiments,	both	in	the	lab	and	 in	 the	 field,	might	 identify	auction	types	as	well	as	 information	revelation	policies	that	perform	even	better	than	the	ones	examined	in	our	lab	experiment.		
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Online	Appendix	A:	Instructions	for	treatment	FPWP	WELCOME	You	 are	 about	 to	 participate	 in	 an	 economic	 experiment.	 The	 instructions	 are	 simple.	 If	 you	follow	them	carefully,	you	may	make	a	substantial	amount	of	money.	Your	earnings	will	be	paid	to	you	in	euros	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	This	will	be	done	confidentially,	one	participant	at	a	time.	Earnings	in	the	experiment	will	be	denoted	by	‘francs’.	At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	francs	will	be	exchanged	 for	euros.	The	exchange	 rate	 is	1	euro	 for	every	70	 francs.	Your	 starting	capital	equals	490	francs	(or	7	euros).	These	instructions	consist	of	seven	pages	like	this.	You	may	page	back	and	forth	by	using	your	mouse	to	click	on	 ‘previous	page’	or	 ‘next	page’	at	the	bottom	of	your	screen.	At	the	bottom	of	your	 screen,	 you	 will	 see	 the	 button	 ‘ready’.	 You	 can	 click	 this	 when	 you	 have	 completely	finished	with	all	pages	of	the	instructions.	AUCTION	In	 today’s	 experiment,	 you	will	 participate	 in	 auctions.	 In	 these	 auctions,	 three	bidders	bid	 to	obtain	a	 fictitious	good.	The	bidders	are	observed	by	an	outside	observer.	 In	 the	remainder	of	these	 instructions	we	will	explain	the	way	in	which	the	auction	is	organized	and	the	rules	you	must	follow.	ROUNDS	Today’s	experiment	consists	of	30	rounds.	In	each	round,	a	fictitious	good	is	auctioned.	In	 the	experiment,	you	will	be	member	of	a	group.	This	group	consists	of	you	and	 three	other	participants.	It	is	unknown	to	you	and	to	the	other	participants	who	is	in	which	group.	The	four	group	members	remain	in	the	same	group	throughout	the	experiment.	Thus,	you	will	meet	the	same	three	participants	in	each	of	the	30	rounds.		In	 every	 round,	 one	 group	 member	 is	 randomly	 chosen	 by	 the	 computer	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	outside	observer.	The	remaining	three	group	members	are	the	bidders	in	the	auction.	THE	VALUE	OF	THE	AUCTIONED	GOOD	The	 value	 of	 the	 fictitious	 good	will	 typically	 differ	 from	 one	 bidder	 to	 the	 next.	 To	 be	more	precise,	in	every	round,	the	computer	will	draw	a	new	value	for	every	bidder.	Values	are	drawn	from	the	set	{1,2,3,…,100}.	Note	the	following	about	the	value	for	the	objects:	1. The	 value	 for	 a	 bidder	 is	 determined	 independently	 of	 the	 values	 for	 the	 other	 two	bidders;	2. Any	value	in	the	set	{1,2,3,…,100}	is	equally	likely;	3. Each	bidder	only	learns	her	own	value,	not	the	value	of	the	other	bidders;	4. The	outside	observer	is	not	informed	about	the	values	of	any	of	the	three	bidders.	
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	THE	AUCTION	In	the	auction,	each	of	the	three	bidders	independently	submit	a	bid	for	the	fictitious	good.	Bids	must	be	chosen	 from	 the	set	 {0,1,2,…,200}.	The	bidder	with	 the	highest	bid	gets	 the	good	and	pays	his	bid.	If	two	or	three	bidders	submit	the	same	(highest)	bid,	the	computer	will	randomly	determine	which	one	obtains	the	good.		THE	OUTSIDE	OBSERVER	After	the	auction,	the	participant	playing	the	role	of	outside	observer	is	asked	to	guess	the	values	of	each	of	the	three	bidders.	Before	she	does	so,	she	obtains	information	about	the	outcome	of	the	auction.	In	particular,	she	is	informed	about	which	bidder	won	the	auction	and	how	much	the	winner	paid.	The	 payoffs	 of	 the	 outside	 observer	 depend	 on	 the	 precision	 of	 her	 estimates.	 Once	 she	 has	entered	value	estimates	for	all	bidders,	the	computer	draws	one	of	the	three	bidders	at	random.	If	 the	outside	observer’s	estimate	 for	 this	bidder	 is	exactly	 correct,	 she	obtains	40	points.	The	further	her	 estimate	 is	 away	 from	 the	 actual	 value,	 the	 lower	 is	 her	payoff.	 Specifically,	 if	 her	estimate	 deviates	 𝑥	 points	 for	 the	 actual	 value,	 her	 payoff	 is	 equal	 to	 40	– 	𝑥.	 In	 words:	 the	outside	 observer	 loses	 one	 point	 for	 every	 unit	 her	 estimate	 is	 further	 away	 from	 the	 actual	value.		EARNINGS	FOR	THE	BIDDERS	The	payoffs	for	the	bidders	are	dependent	on	both	the	outcome	of	the	auction	and	the	estimate	of	the	outside	observer.		If	a	bidder	does	not	win	the	object,	his	earnings	in	a	round	only	depend	on	the	value	the	outside	observer	estimated	this	bidder	to	have:		 (Earnings)	=	(The	outside	observer’s	value	estimate)/2		So,	a	bidder	earns	half	a	franc	for	every	franc	in	the	outside	observer’s	value	estimate.	A	bidder’s	earnings	do	not	depend	on	the	outside	observer’s	estimated	values	for	the	other	two	bidders.		If	a	bidder	wins	the	object,	his	earnings	in	a	round	will	depend	on	both	his	profits	in	the	auction	and	the	outside	observer’s	value	estimate:		(Earnings)	=	(Value	for	the	good)	–	(Winning	bid)	+	(The	outside	observer’s	value	estimate)/2		Note	that	a	bidder	gets	the	same	payoffs	from	the	outside	observer’s	estimate,	win	or	lose.			
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Online	Appendix	B:	Derivation	of	equilibrium	bidding	curves	In	this	appendix,	we	derive	the	equilibrium	bidding	curves.	Consider	a	setting	with	𝑛 ≥2	bidders,	indexed	𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛,	bidding	for	a	single,	indivisible	object.	Bidders’	values	for	the	object	are	i.i.d.	according	to	a	smooth	distribution	function	𝐹	on	[0, 𝑣],	𝑣 > 0.	The	auction	outcome	is	partly	revealed	to	an	outside	observer.	We	assume	that	a	bidder’s	payoffs	are	increased	by	𝛾𝑣	(𝛾 > 0),	if	the	outside	observer’s	estimate	of	the	bidder’s	value	equals	𝑣.	For	the	analysis,	we	presume	that	bidders	bid	according	to	the	same,	strictly	increasing,	bidding	curves.	In	equilibrium,	the	outside	observer	updates	her	beliefs	about	the	bidders’	values	accordingly.	The	structure	of	this	appendix	is	as	follows:	in	sections	B.1	and	B.2,	we	derive	equilibrium	bidding	curves	for	settings	in	which	the	outside	observer	is	informed	about	who	wins	the	auctions	and	how	much	the	winner	pays	in	a	first-price	sealed-bid	auction	and	second-price	sealed-bid	auction,	respectively.	In	section	B.3,	we	consider	the	case	where	the	outside	observer	is	only	informed	about	the	winner	of	the	auction.		
B.1	First-price	sealed-bid	auction	winner	payment	Assume	that	bidders	bid	according	to	a	strictly	increasing	bidding	curve	𝐵(𝑣).	Now,	consider	a	bidder	with	a	value	𝑣	bidding	as	if	his	value	were	𝑤 ∈ [0, 𝑣].	If	the	other	bidders	stick	to	the	equilibrium	bidding	curve,	this	bidder’s	expected	payoffs	equal	
𝑢 𝑣,𝑤 = 𝐹 P 𝑤 𝑣 − 𝐵 𝑤 + 𝛾𝑤 + 𝛾 𝑉(𝑥)YZ 𝑑𝐹 P 𝑥 ,	where	𝐹 P 	denotes	the	distribution	of	the	highest-order	statistic	of	𝑛 − 1	i.i.d.	draws	from	𝐹.	The	first	term	on	the	RHS	refers	to	the	case	in	which	the	bidder	wins	and	then	the	outside	observer	induces	that	the	bidder’s	value	equals	𝑤.	The	second	term	is	the	bidder’s	payoff	when	losing	the	auction,	where	𝑉 𝑥 	denotes	the	outside	observer’s	optimal	value	estimate	for	losing	bidders.	The	equilibrium	FOC	is	given	by	𝜕𝑢 𝑣,𝑤𝜕𝑤 ZOY = 𝑓 P 𝑣 𝑣 − 𝐵 𝑣 + 𝛾𝑣 − 𝐹 P 𝑣 𝐵] 𝑣 − 𝛾 − 𝛾𝑉(𝑣)𝑓 P 𝑣 = 0	⇔ 𝑓 P 𝑣 𝐵 𝑣 − 𝛾𝑣 + 𝐹 P 𝑣 𝐵] 𝑣 − 𝛾 = 	 𝑣 − 𝛾𝑉(𝑣) 𝑓 P 𝑣 ,	
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where	𝑓 P 	is	the	density	function	corresponding	to	𝐹 P .	Taking	into	account	the	boundary	condition	𝐵 𝑣 = 0,	we	find	the	following	solution	for	the	resulting	differential	equation:	
𝐵 𝑣 = 𝑥 − 𝛾𝑉(𝑥) 𝑑𝐹 P 𝑥Y_ 𝐹 P 𝑣 + 𝛾𝑣.	For	the	parameters	used	in	the	experiment	(𝛾 = 1/2,	𝑛 = 3,	𝐹 = 𝑈[0,1]),	we	have	𝑉 𝑥 = 𝑥/2	and	𝐹 P 𝑣 = 𝑣a	from	which	it	follows	that	𝐵 𝑣 = 𝑣.		
B.2	Second-price	sealed-bid	auction	winner	payment	The	analysis	for	the	second-price	sealed-bid	auction	is	analogous	to	the	first.	Let	𝐹 a 𝑤|𝑥 	denote	the	distribution	of	the	second	highest	value	among	the	𝑛 − 1	other	bidders	if	a	bidder	pretends	to	have	value	𝑤,	conditional	on	the	highest	value	among	the	other	bidders	being	𝑥.	Moreover,	we	will	let	𝑉(𝑥)	represent	the	outside	observer’s	estimate	of	the	winner’s	value,	conditional	on	the	second-highest	value	being	𝑥.	We	then	have:	
𝑢 𝑣,𝑤 = 𝑣 − 𝐵 𝑥 + 𝛾𝑉(𝑥)Z_ 𝑑𝐹 P 𝑥 + 𝛾 𝑣(𝑥|𝑤)YZ 𝑑𝐹 P 𝑥 .	where	𝑣 𝑥 𝑤 = 𝑤𝐹 a 𝑤|𝑥 + ca 𝑑𝐹 a 𝑦|𝑥dZ 	represents	the	expected	value	of	the	outside	observer’s	value	estimate	of	a	bidder	who	bids	as	if	having	value	𝑤,	conditional	on	the	highest	value	among	the	𝑛 − 1	other	bidders	being	𝑥.	Notice	that	𝑙𝑖𝑚Z↑d𝑣 𝑥 𝑤 =𝑥.	The	equilibrium	FOC:	
𝑣 − 𝐵 𝑣 + 𝛾𝑉(𝑣) 𝑓 P 𝑣 − 𝛾𝑙𝑖𝑚Y↑Z𝑣 𝑣 𝑤 𝑓 P 𝑣 + 𝛾 𝜕𝑣 𝑥 𝑣𝜕𝑤YY 𝑑𝐹 P 𝑥 = 0 ⇔	
𝐵 𝑣 = 1 − 𝛾 𝑣 + 𝛾𝑉(𝑣) + 𝛾 𝜕𝑣 𝑥 𝑣𝜕𝑤YY 𝑑𝐹 P 𝑥 /𝑓 P 𝑣 .	For	the	parameters	used	in	the	experiment,	𝐵 𝑣 = 𝑣/2 + 5/8.	
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B.3	Winner-only,	both	auction	types	The	predictions	for	the	winner-only	treatments	are	straightforward:	bidders’	equilibrium	bids	are	the	standard	equilibrium	bids	in	a	setting	without	outside	observer	inflated	by	𝛾	times	the	difference	between	the	outside	observer’s	value	estimates	for	the	winner	and	the	losing	bidders.	When	estimating	a	bidder’s	value,	the	outside	observer	minimizes	w.r.t.	𝑤:	
𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑑𝐺 𝑣Y_ = 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑑𝐺 𝑣Z_ + 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑑𝐺 𝑣YZ ,	where	𝐺	is	the	outside	observer’s	belief,	i.e.,	the	distribution	function	of	the	bidder’s	value.	The	FOC:	 𝑑𝐺 𝑣Z_ − 𝑑𝐺 𝑣YZ = 0 ⇔ 2𝐺 𝑤 − 1 = 0.	For	the	three-bidder	case,	with	values	uniformly	distributed	on	[0,100],	𝐺 𝑣 = 𝑣N/10g	for	the	winning	bidder,	under	the	assumption	that	bidders	submit	bids	according	to	the	same	strictly	increasing	bidding	curve.	This	implies	that	the	outside	observer’s	best	guess	equals	𝑤 = 100/ 2h ≈ 79.	W.r.t.	the	guesses	for	the	losing	bidders,	𝐺 𝑣 = NYa__ −𝑣N/2 /10g.	The	outside	observer’s	optimal	guess	is	approximately	equal	to	35.	The	difference	between	the	estimates	equals	about	44,	which	translates	to	the	inflation	of	bids	by	22.	 	
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Online	Appendix	C:	Additional	figures	Table	C.1:	Bids	submitted	
	
	
		
Notes:	The	solid	lines	refer	to	the	equilibrium	bidding	curves	
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	Table	 C.2:	 Average	 outside	 observer’s	 estimates,	 and	 average	 bidder’s	 values,	conditional	on	winner’s	payment	for	the	FP	auction	
	
Notes:	The	dots	represent	the	outside	observers’	value	estimates;	solid	lines	refer	to	the	actual	values	of	the	bidders;	the	dashed	lines	are	the	outcomes	of	linear	regressions	of	the	outsider	observers’	value	estimates	on	the	winner	payment;	the	two	panels	at	the	bottom	plot	the	difference	in	the	outside	observers’	value	estimates	between	winning	and	losing	bidders.		 	
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Table	C.3:	Average	outside	observer’s	estimates	and	average	bidder’s	values	for	each	winner’s	payment	for	the	SP	auction	
	
Notes:	The	dots	represent	the	outside	observers’	value	estimates;	solid	lines	refer	to	the	actual	values	of	the	bidders;	the	dashed	lines	are	the	outcomes	of	linear	regressions	of	the	outsider	observers’	value	estimates	on	the	winner	payment;	the	two	panels	at	the	bottom	plot	the	difference	in	the	outside	observers’	value	estimates	between	winning	and	losing	bidders.	
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